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ABSTRACT. In order to take ethical considerations of patenting biological material
into account, the so-called ‘‘ordre public or morality clause’’ was implemented as
Article 6 in the EC directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions,
98/44/EC. At ﬁrst glance, this seems to provide a signiﬁcant advantage to the
European patent system with respect to ethics. The thesis of this paper argues that
the ordre public or morality clause does not provide suﬃcient protection against
ethically problematic uses of the patent system within the area of life. On the con-
trary, there are worrisome obstacles to any eﬀective and comprehensive critical
analysis of the ethical aspects of bio-patenting, especially in the ﬁeld of agriculture.
These obstacles can be seen as indirect consequences of the implementation of ethical
considerations in form of the ordre public and morality clause in the EC Directive.
Therefore, Article 6 of the EC Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological
inventions seems to ultimately weaken the position of ethics in the debate concerning
bio-patenting because the ordre public and morality clause is usually interpreted in an
exclusively bio-ethical way in the sense of an ‘‘intrinsic ethics,’’ which is primarily
interested in questions regarding the moral status of particular entities. It is argued
that an important cause of this phenomenon is that the decisive reasons against
bio-patenting are concerns of social ethics, and not bio-ethics.
KEY WORDS: agricultural bio-technology, EC bio-patenting directive, ethics,
ordre public and morality clause, patents
1. INTRODUCTION
Patenting aims at promoting technological innovation and advancement
expected to beneﬁt society at large. In order to realize this end, an
innovator is given a set of exclusive rights in the form of a patent to
either prevent commercial use of the invention by others for a ﬁxed
period of time (usually 20 years) or to require licensing fees for the
commercial use of the patented innovation. By conferring such a limited
monopoly in exchange for public disclosure of the new technology, it is
expected to enable the patentee to market the respective invention in a
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proﬁtable way and thus to regain the invested costs of research and
development.
The rights granted in the form of a patent might thus be interpreted as
sort of a reward assigned to the patent holder in exchange for introducing an
innovative product or process into the public domain along with the dis-
closure of its speciﬁcations. Exclusion rights (rights that allow the holder to
exclude other parties from the commercial use of a patented invention) have
been shown, however, to contradict societal interest in an economy free
from monopolies, and to also put into peril the freedom of research (see
Wolfrum and Stoll, 2001). Therefore, the privileges assigned to the patent
holder may need to be balanced both against the invention’s expected use-
fulness for society at large and the inventor’s eﬀorts. In order to ensure this
delicate balance of interests, patents are only granted for inventions and not
for discoveries. Furthermore, the inventions need to prove to be novel and
suited for commercial use, as well as being non-obvious. This is to say that
an invention ought not to be so obvious as to be easily derived from the
current level of technology by the average expert in the ﬁeld. From an
ethical point of view, both the promotion of technological advancement and
the just and fair compensation of an inventor’s contributions seem legiti-
mate. Above that, the patenting system can be understood in a certain sense
to work as an instrument securing commutative justice in practice:
Considering the risks and costs involved with the research and development
of technological innovations, and taking into account the common good
arising from the public disclosure of the resulting invention, it is fair and just
to reward the innovative party in an appropriate and equitable way.
But does this line of thought apply to the realm of living things as well?
Or are there rather distinctive features that put into question the appli-
cation of patent law to biological materials? A ﬁrst glance at relevant legal
texts, as well as the legal and ethical debates concerning bio-patenting,
points to two ﬁndings. With regard to the current legal practice of granting
patents, both the patenting of biological resources and the methods these
materials are being used basically fall under the same set of requirements as
for patenting non-living material. This is in accordance with Article 27(1)
of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (hereafter called ‘‘TRIPS Agreement’’), which states with regard to
patentable subject matters that patents shall be available for any invention
in all ﬁelds of technology. Nonetheless, despite this reasonably well-deﬁned
and clear-cut patent law, the general ethical legitimacy of bio-patenting and
its speciﬁc ethical conﬁnes remain most controversial.1 To name just one
1 Cf., inter alia, Hermere´n, 2000; Warner, 2001; Baumgartner and Mieth, 2003 on the ethical
debate on bio-patenting.
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example: It is argued that the identiﬁcation and isolation of genes and
DNA sequences do not satisfy the eligibility requirement of patentable
material because it is a discovery, not an invention. Public interest usually
focuses on patent applications ﬁled on innovations in the ﬁeld of bio-
medical research, including such well-known patent examples as the
‘‘breast cancer genes’’ or the ‘‘Harvard onco-mouse.’’ The attention of the
public has turned more recently to the ethical aspects of patenting with
regard to bio-technological developments in the ﬁeld of agriculture.2
Discussion has revolved around such patents as those on ‘‘Golden Rice’’
and those on maize plants with a content of oil and oleic acids exceeding a
certain threshold level.
In light of the lively discussion of the ethical aspects of patenting, ethical
limitations on the patentability of biological material were explicitly in-
cluded in the wording of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions (‘‘Directive’’ in the following). Eﬀective the ﬁrst of September
1999, the Directive was implemented in the form of the rules 23(b)–23(e) in
the European Patent Convention and is now legally authoritative for the
granting of patents in Europe.
2. THE ORDRE PUBLIC AND MORALITY CLAUSE: ETHICAL
ASPECTS OF BIO-PATENTING IN THE EC DIRECTIVE
Article 6 of the Directive is the undeniable ethical heart of current EC
patenting legislation. Known commonly as the ordre public and morality
clause, it proves crucial as far as the outer ethical limitations of patentability
are concerned.3
1. Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial
exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality; however,
exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is
prohibited by law or regulation.
2. On the basis of paragraph 1, the following, in particular, shall be
considered unpatentable:
2 This article will refer to all technological developments as agricultural bio-technological
developments or innovations that initially treat non-human biological material and that are
applied (or employed) during food production. This comprises not only micro-biological and
plant products, but also any processed product that is based on biological material originating
from (non-human) animals.
3 Article 6 of the Directive does not create an entirely new patent law. It mirrors article 53(a)
of the European Patent Convention that can be seen as the progenitor of article 6 of the
Directive.
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(a) processes for cloning human beings;
(b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings;
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes;
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely
to cause them suﬀering without any substantial medical beneﬁt to man
or animal, and also animals resulting from such processes.
By referring to ‘‘ordre public and morality’’ as ethical limits to the patent-
ability of bio-technological innovations, the Directive ipso facto contains
provisions suited for an (initial) assessment of the ethical aspects of any
corresponding patent application. Such option should not be regarded as a
matter of course – it is seen as the exception, rather than the rule. Patent law
in the United States, for instance, does not stipulate any similar provision to
Article 6.4
Article 6 of the Directive, at ﬁrst glance, appears to be the result of an
eﬀective debate on the ethical aspects of the legal protection of technological
innovations in the ﬁeld of life sciences. Its practical impact, however, largely
depends ﬁrstly on its judicial interpretation and secondly on its legal imple-
mentation at national and EU-level. Since the concept of ordre public and
morality remains fairly vague, it allows for certain leeway in interpretation.5
According to recital 38 of the Directive, the list of processes that are contrary
to the ordre public and morality are deﬁned as unpatentable in Article 6(2)
needs to be understood as ‘‘an illustrative list’’ only, one included, in the
words of the Directive, ‘‘to provide national courts and patent oﬃces with a
general guide to interpreting the reference to ordre public and morality.’’ It is
clearly stated that this list ‘‘obviously cannot presume to be exhaustive.’’
Likewise, recital 38 oﬀers leeway of interpretation while simultaneously
providing speciﬁc examples that violate the concept of human dignity, stating,
‘‘Processes, the use of which oﬀend against human dignity, such as processes
to produce chimeras from germ cells or totipotent cells of humans and
animals, are obviously also excluded from patentability.’’6
4 Cf. Bagley, 2003. Margo A. Bagley characterizes the US approach as ‘‘patent ﬁrst, ask
questions later,’’ while labeling the European approach as ‘‘ask questions ﬁrst, patent later.’’
Bagley assesses the European inclusion of an express morality-based exclusion bar in the EC
directive quite positively, particularly in comparison to the US approach.
5 Cf. Van Overwalle, 2003, p. 152: ‘‘[A]rticle 6 of the EU bio-technology directive is the
subject of an ongoing debate. [...] [T]he principle laid down in article 6(1) raises serious inter-
pretation problems.’’ An opposing point of view is presented by Tade Matthias Spranger who
argues that the terminology of public order and morality ‘‘has materially been clariﬁed by
jurisdiction and law teaching to a suﬃcient degree so as to function as legal terms’’ (Spranger,
1999, p. 598).
6 See also the beginning of recital 16: ‘‘Patent law must be applied so as to respect the
fundamental principles safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person.’’
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The ethical principles on which grounds innovations are considered
unpatentable are human dignity (see recitals 16 and 38) and the principle of
not causing unnecessary harm or suﬀering to sentient animals (Article
6(2)d).7 But these are principles of a normative bio-ethics in the strictest
sense. They are closely, even directly, related to the question of the ‘‘moral
status’’ of either the to-be-patented biological material or of the animal/
living being that provides the biological material in question. Keith Douglas
Warner speaks in a similar context of ‘‘intrinsic ethics,’’ a term that for us
adequately deﬁnes the narrow concept of ethics that is used in interpretation
of the Directive (Warner, 2001, 309).
The predominant interpretation of Article 6(1) corresponds to this eth-
ical point of view. Historically, it has been a general principle of patent law
that exclusions from patentability are to be interpreted narrowly and
inclusions broadly.8 Consequently, Geertrui Van Overwalle argues that it is
‘‘generally accepted that the twin concept ordre public and morality is used
to deﬁne the utter limits of what present society tolerates and to delimit the
absolutely unacceptable’’ (Van Overwalle, 2003, p. 152). Accordingly,
Article 6 of the Directive is considered a narrow gate of entry for ‘‘the main
principles underlying the legal system’’ (Cf. Van Overwalle, 2003, pp. 152;
Godt, 2003, p. 55).9
Despite this markedly narrow gate of entry for the due regard of ethical
considerations in patenting, Article 6 of the Directive proved signiﬁcant in a
decision by the European Court of Justice regarding the so-called Edin-
burgh patent (EP 695351). In 1999, this patent was granted to the University
of Edinburgh for a method by which ‘‘animal stem cells’’ could be geneti-
cally modiﬁed so as to give them a survival advantage over unwanted
diﬀerentiated cells, and in this way they could be cultured and isolated. On
the grounds that the term ‘‘animal stem cells’’ might also be interpretatively
extended to include human embryonic stem cells (which when derived from
human embryos result in the destruction of the embryo), opposition to the
Edinburgh patent was formally lodged by fourteen parties, including the
governments of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. In June 2003,
following an opposition hearing, the patent was amended and conﬁned
speciﬁcally to ‘‘other than embryonic stem cells’’ (see also Baumgartner and
Mieth, 2006).
7 The discussion on the patenting of the so-called ‘‘Onco-mouse’’ provided the background
for the inclusion of this principle into the Directive. See also Godt, 2003, p. 53.
8 Beyleveld and Brownsword, 2003, p. 133.
9 Margo A. Bagley, who assesses the European patent law quite positively, acknowledges
that the ordre public and morality clause is ‘‘a very narrow focus’’ for the inquiry of the moral
aspects of a patent application. Cf. Bagley, 2003, p. 519.
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Due to the ‘‘dependency’’ of Article 6(1) of the Directive on bio-ethical
principles in the stricter sense – such as human dignity or the precept not to
cause needless suﬀering to sentient beings – the concept of public order and
public morals (ordre public and morality) seems to be applied almost
exclusively to innovations in the ﬁeld of bio-medical research. This becomes
most evident in a comparison of Article 6 of the EC bio-patenting directive
with the corresponding text passage in the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS
Agreement as well makes mention of the concept of ordre public and
morality, however it is characterized as a merely available and not a man-
datory criterion for the exclusion of inventions from patentability. It also
applies to inventions outside the realm of living things. Unlike the case of
the EC directive, this TRIPS clause is not illustrated by the examples in
Article 27(2):
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their
territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public
or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid
serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made
merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.
Recital 36 of the EC directive directly alludes to this passage, which, how-
ever, was not included in the operative part of the Directive.10 This bears
some relevance to the question of whether the provisions provide a possibility
to exclude bio-technological innovations in the ﬁeld of agriculture from
patentability, given that the exclusion is based on ethical deliberations only.
To sum up, one may say that Article 6 of the EC Directive provides a
morally-based exclusion bar for patentability. However, the predominant
interpretation of Article 6 that is to a certain degree predetermined by the
text of the Directive (e.g., the strong focus on principles of an ‘‘intrinsic’’
bio-ethics and the omission of parts of the corresponding Article of the
TRIPS Agreement) results in a very limited scope for an application of
Article 6.
3. PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE ETHICAL ASSESSMENT
OF PATENTING IN AGRICULTURAL BIO-TECHNOLOGY
The examples given in the Directive as a guideline to interpreting the
concept of ordre public and morality are excluded from patentability for the
reason that their application or commercial use directly and evidently
10 The operative part of a directive (the articles) is key to the meaning of its recitals. The
precise nature of recitals, however, along with their legal binding force, remains controversial.
‘‘They act to provide a context for patent law provisions by which to guide legal interpretation.
[...] According to prevailing opinion, they act as a ‘legally binding reference point for
interpretation’’’ (Godt, 2003, p. 54).
CHRISTOPH BAUMGARTNER526
violates core principles of the European value system. Hence, the reason for
exclusion is inherent to the invention itself or to its (anticipated) application
and is clearly not based on the granting of intellectual property rights
pertaining to any speciﬁc technological innovation. ‘‘There is a strong
feeling that Article 6(2) does not aim at limiting the patent implications of
certain bio-tech inventions, but wishes to exclude certain ﬁelds of research as
such’’ (Van Overwalle, 2003, p. 153. Emphases in original).
This oﬀers substantial implicationswith regard to the questionwhether the
exclusion from patentability of bio-technological developments in the ﬁeld of
agriculture is possible on the basis of ethical considerations. First, the bearing
of Article 6 of the Directive is highly problematic because such agricultural
innovations do not showany direct reference to the principle of human dignity
or to the ban on causing animals suﬀering without any substantial medical
beneﬁt. This I will call the ‘‘problem of an inappropriate ethics.’’
Secondly, the evaluation process of all ethical aspects of bio-technology
as required by Article 7 of the Directive is rendered impossible by the fact
that the concept of ordre public and morality constitutes the sole point of
reference for any ethical assessment of patent applications.11 This I will call
the ‘‘problem of an impediment to comprehensive and eﬀective ethical
review through the implementation of ethical considerations into law.’’
By no means do these problems prove signiﬁcant only in the context of
agricultural bio-technology – their particular importance in this area,
however, must not be overlooked. They shall be examined further in the
following paragraphs.
4. THE ‘‘PROBLEM OF AN INAPPROPRIATE ETHICS’’
As has already been shown above, Article 6 of the Directive is only applicable
to those technological developments that society considers ethically false in
themselves, so that their use appears unacceptable for reasons of principle –
irrespective of the question whether or not their use yields desirable results.
This, from the outset, is not the case with agricultural bio-technological
inventions, since they neither rely on extracted biological material that results
in the destruction of human life (as was one potential outcome in the ﬁrst
phrasing of the so-called Edinburgh patent) nor are they closely linked with
‘‘suﬀering without any substantial medical beneﬁt.’’
11 Article 7 reads, ‘‘The Commission’s European Group on Ethics in Science and New
Technologies evaluates all ethical aspects of bio-technology.’’ The limits set for the patenting of
bio-technological innovations then appear in recital 44, which, following the exact wording of
article 7, states, ‘‘Whereas it should be pointed out in this connection that that Group may be
consulted only where bio-technology is to be evaluated at the level of basic ethical principles,
including where it is consulted on patent law.’’
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Nonetheless, it does not follow that the patenting of genetically modiﬁed
micro-organisms, for instance, or of transgenic seed and crops is free from
ethical concerns. Public discourse on the ethical permissibility and allow-
ability of bio-patenting was initially triggered in 1980 by a micro-organism,
after the US Supreme Court’s landmark Chakrabarty decision aﬃrmed the
patentability of a genetically modiﬁed micro-organism capable of breaking
down crude oil.12 The ethical assessment of patents in the context of agri-
cultural bio-technology, however, is based on principles beyond those
speciﬁed in Article 6(2) and the recitals 16 and 38 of the Directive, and
proceeds rather by criteria not immediately derived from bio-ethical prin-
ciples in the strict sense (such as the question regarding the moral status of a
speciﬁc entity). Instead, in this context, critics often address problems sim-
ilar to the following kind:13
– Small farmers may become increasingly dependent on large seed com-
panies due to the patenting of seed. The lion’s share of patents on
seed and other biological materials suited for use in agriculture is
owned by a handful of transnational seed companies that control ac-
cess to major agricultural resources. The present situation might
mark the beginning of an oligarchic agro-business system. Viewed in
this light, fears arise that future small-size farmers might only have a
small number of patent-free seed cultivars at their disposal that will
prove less eﬃcient than patented seeds and produce smaller yield.
Experience suggests that because of the high cost of patented seeds,
small farmers would no longer be able to exist independently of large
seed companies.14
– Bio-patents frequently function as instruments for exploiting developing
countries. There have been instances, for example, of researchers from
12 See Kevles, 2002 for further information. Apart from marking the start of public
controversy with regard to bio-patenting, this ruling also constitutes the onset of an increase in
both scope and numbers of bio-patents.
13 These well-known points of discussion can only be mentioned in brief here. Cf. CIDSE,
2000; Hermere´n, 2000; Svatos, 2000; Warner, 2001; CIPR, 2002; Nilles, 2003; Tsioumanis et al.,
2003; Van den Belt, 2003 with regard to the ethical aspects of patenting in the ﬁeld of agri-
cultural bio-technology.
14 With regard to the eﬀect of patenting systems on developing countries, the Commission on
Intellectual Property describes the danger of excluding speciﬁc groups of persons or even entire
societies from the beneﬁts of technological advance as a potential result of patenting: ‘‘The
system provides the incentive for individuals and companies to invent and develop new tech-
nologies that may beneﬁt society. But incentives work diﬀerently according to whether there is a
capacity to respond to them. And, by conferring exclusive rights, costs are imposed on con-
sumers and other users of protected technologies. In some cases, protection means that
potential consumers or users, who are unable to pay the prices charged by IP [Intellectual
Property] owners, are deprived of access to the innovations the IP system is intended to make
available.’’ (CIPR, 2002, p. 5).
CHRISTOPH BAUMGARTNER528
Western bio-tech industries prospecting in Third World countries rich in
natural and biological resources in order to collect samples of biological
materials, which, after being modiﬁed, are then sold back in the form of
patented products to the very farmers and customers in the very same
developing countries. Often the seeds produced are sterilized so that
farmers must buy new (expensive) seed for each harvesting season–unless
they wish to gamble on re-using their traditional ‘‘old’’ seed, which
might, however, yield less than the patented ones. The problem posed by
such practices is not the same as potential patent misuse and from which
it does not necessarily follow that bio-patents are problematic in terms of
ethics. If anything, as the above two examples elucidate, the danger of
patents originates in the context of the economic competition and imbal-
ance from which they cannot be separately considered. These have far
graver ethical implication than the individual patent holder’s intentions.
– Relating to the problem described in the previous paragraph, research-
ers and entrepreneurs from highly-industrialized countries sometimes
are accused of ‘‘bio-piracy,’’ which is to say that they appropriate and
privatize traditional knowledge of indigenous populations, particularly
in the Global South. Such appropriation also occurs from local biologi-
cal resources without ﬁrst seeking the prior informed consent of the
holder or owner of the indigenous knowledge, adding insult to injury
by failing to share the beneﬁts prospected in this process. This is in di-
rect contrast to any number of possible schemes or rules of beneﬁt shar-
ing. The people whose traditional knowledge and biological resources
are being appropriated do not only run the risk of being exploited, but,
adding injury to insult, also might be excluded from the free use of the
respective biological material if it gets patented. The products derived
from the Neem tree are a prime example in this context.
– Evidence that patents on genes and gene sequences frequently aﬀect
bio-technological research and development in a negative way seems to
fundamentally contradict the patenting system’s main objective to foster
technological innovation. There are various reasons for this. Besides the
concentration and monopolization trends already outlined above, the
resulting rise in prices needs to be duly noted, as it eminently inﬂuences
research in areas that require the use of already patented material.
While it is true that access to information on patented research results
is basically free for the scientiﬁc community, one needs, however, to
diﬀerentiate between ‘‘free access’’ and ‘‘free use’’ in this context.15 The
fact that research results published during the patenting proceedings
15 See Gertruui Van Overwalle, Contributions in the Forum Bio-ethics of the German
National Ethics Council on April 23, 2003, transcript, p. 14 (Source: http://www.ethikrat.org/
texte/pdf/Forum_Patent_03–04–23_Protokoll.pdf).
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are freely available for study and are thus in the public domain, does
not imply that the use of the respective information for one’s own
research is free of cost. Rather, research can be inhibited in ﬁelds
characterized by a multitude of fragmented patents because of the
high transaction costs of licensing earlier patents. Such research is
frequently considered less (ﬁnancially) viable. As a result, scientists
(may) consult patent databases prior to choosing their ﬁeld of re-
search in order to assess future licensing fees and even change their
ﬁeld of study in the face of prohibitively high costs.16 In addition, it
seems reasonable to assume that scientiﬁcally useful information is
being withheld from the public until after a patent application has
been ﬁled, since an invention, if it is to remain patentable, must not
have been published before.17
The questions and problems outlined here for exemplary purposes make it
clear that the ethical aspects of patenting in the ﬁeld of agricultural bio-
technology rather pertain to the study of social ethics than to the area of an
‘‘intrinsic’’ bio-ethics in the above strict sense. They are closely related to
questions of food security, justice, and (free) access to speciﬁc or scarce
resources. These aspects simply cannot be traced back to principles such as
human dignity or to the precept of not causing unnecessary harm and
suﬀering to animals. Moreover, even if the assessment of an agricultural or
bio-technological patent application was considered ethically problematic or
outright wrong in light of these social concerns, it would still miss making
any substantive link to the sole point of reference included in the Directive.
16 The resulting problem was termed the ‘‘tragedy of the anticommons’’ by Michael Heller
and Rebecca Eisenberg. While in the case of the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ (Garrett Hardin),
an analogy widely known in the context of environmental protection, a conﬂict emerges from
the free unregulated access to a resource that any individual actor may use at his/her discretion,
resulting in the over-exploitation of said (common) resource. The scenario characterized by
Heller and Eisenberg is the exact opposite: As a result of the privatization of research and
particularly due to a corresponding patenting practice, valuable resources for research run the
risk of being wasted or being utilized most ineﬀectively because too many patent owners have
the right to exclude each other from the use of vital parts of the overall resource. Competing
patents of this kind lead to a decrease in the development of novel products and methods
instead of an increase (Cf. Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Provisions such as the privileged status
of research (‘‘research exemption’’) laid down in section 11 of the German Patent Law fail to
adequately address this problem in the context of bio-technology. While the German research
exemption, for instance, covers experimental acts performed on patented inventions and about
them such as scientiﬁc experiments researching into the way the respective invention works (its
modus operandi) and aiming at its further development, it does not cover experiments in which
the patented invention is merely used to yield knowledge on subject matters outside the original
patent – that is research using said patented invention. Therefore, this latter kind of research in
which the patented invention is merely instrumental in use, is subject to licensing fees. This
provision has serious consequences especially with regard to genes and gene sequences due to
the multi-functionality of genes.
17 See Schneider (2003, pp. 185–186) for further information.
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It may be the case that there is nothing in the Directive that explicitly
precludes ethical considerations concerning patenting developments in the
ﬁeld of agricultural biotechnology. But the predominant narrow interpre-
tation of Article 6 that is strongly suggested by the text of the directive
proves to be de facto an eﬀective bar. Hence, the exclusion of bio-techno-
logical innovations in the ﬁeld of agriculture from patentability by referring
to explicitly ethical deliberations proves diﬃcult: Not only are they fre-
quently considered ethically unproblematic themselves, but there is also the
need for the ethical problems associated with said innovations to be of the
‘‘right kind’’ of ethical problems.
5. BIO-PATENTING IN LIGHT OF THEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE
AND CHURCH STATEMENTS18
Does a theological approach or an explicitly theological ethics provide a
way to deal with the ‘‘problem of an inappropriate ethics’’ adequately?
There are numerous statements by representatives of religious groups and
denominations, often supported by documents drawn up by church-related
organizations, that assess both the potentials and problems of bio-patenting.
Exemplary organizations and texts that prove relevant include, the World
Council of Churches (WCC) 1982 report ‘‘Manipulating Life: Ethical Issues
in Genetic Engineering;’’ the 1987 ‘‘Statement of Religious Leaders against
Animal Patenting;’’ the WCC Department on Church and Society’s
‘‘Bio-technology: Its Challenges to the Churches and the World;’’ the ‘‘Joint
Appeal against Human and Animal Patenting’’ that was adopted in May
1995 by church leaders representing more than 80 diﬀerent groups; the
European Ecumenical Commission for Church and Society (EECCS)’s 1998
document titled ‘‘EECCS and Bio-ethics;’’ and, ﬁnally, the ‘‘Bio-patenting
and the Threat to Food Security: A Christian and Development Perspec-
tive’’ published in 2000 by the non-governmental organization Coope´ration
Internationale pour le De´veloppement et la Solidarite´ (CIDSE).
These documents are generally critical in their assessment of bio-pat-
enting and, when taken together, basically constitute three main lines of
argument or critique:
(1) A ﬁrst criticism derives from the conviction that all life and the en-
tirety of living beings are gifts and creatures of God. Thus, due to their
bonding and enduring relationship to God, a special quality (partic-
ularity) is accorded to them that is commonly referred to as the
18 Cf. CIDSE, 2000; Cole-Turner, 2000; Warner, 2001; Cunningham, 2003 for the following
paragraphs.
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‘‘dignity as a creature’’ or God-given ‘‘sanctity.’’ Patent law implicitly
assumes living beings, isolated parts, or genetically modiﬁed entities
can be ‘‘invented’’ by man. This assumption is vigorously denied on
grounds of the religious belief that God is the sole creator and
‘‘inventor’’ of all living beings and who is thus, according to this line
of reasoning, the sole holder of all intellectual property rights as re-
gards the realm of living things. R. Cole-Turner succinctly expresses
this notion as follows:
In this view, as Creator, God reserves the right to determine how the knowledge of
organic development is to be used. In a way, it is as if God the Creator were the ﬁrst
to patent genes, not to exclude us from using the knowledge, but to exclude us from
excluding others. (Cole-Turner, 2000, p. 837).19
(2) Another theological argument, based on the previous point of criticism,
emphasizes said dignity of life or particularity by pointing out that a
living being is being reduced to a mere substance or resource and
eventually commodiﬁed through the act of patenting. The granting of
bio-patents ignores the speciﬁc status inherent to living beings due to
their relation to God, the same status that distinguishes them from non-
living things:
The patenting of life encodes into law a reductionist conception of life which seeks to
remove any distinction between living and non-living things [...] This mechanistic
view directly contradicts the sacramental, interrelated view of life intrinsic to a
theology of the integrity of creation.20
(3) Social ethical arguments against bio-patenting from a perspective of
religious understanding are not explicitly theological ones. Rather, these
aim at aspects already dealt with in the above section on the ‘‘problem
of an inappropriate ethics’’: the appropriation and privatization of
19 The aforementioned criticism of the notion of invention is also supported in other contexts
independent of a religious background – though with a slightly diﬀerent emphasis. There, the
aspect of an over-compensation for the respective inventor is frequently brought forward. As
has already been pointed out, the eﬀorts performed by the inventor in advance need to be
balanced in a just and fair way against the ‘‘price’’ society pays for the utilization of a patented
innovation. In the area of bio-technology, each innovation is derived from at least three
components: ‘‘Nature (creation), previous intellectual works provided by others, and the
individual work (eﬀort) of the inventor.’’ (Dolder, 2003, p. 3.) Therefore, the exclusive rights
granted in a patent should be limited in scope to the eﬀort contributed by the inventor: ‘‘The
factum, which comprises the intellectual work put forward by the inventor, is to be regarded
patentable, not the genitum which originates from nature (creation)’’ (ibid.). The patenting of
biological resources themselves (such as transgenic seed, genetically modiﬁed organisms etc.)
appears an undue reward given the signiﬁcant part the genitum has in such invention.
20 World Council of Churches, Department on Church and Society, Biotechnology: Its
Challenges to the Churches and the World, quoted in Cole-Turner, 2000, p. 836. Paige Com-
stock Cunningham speaks in this context of an ‘‘erosion of the imago Dei’’ due to the patenting
of human genes (Cunningham, 2003).
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genetic resources found in developing countries for materialistic reasons
in connection with the availability of patenting (‘‘bio-piracy’’); the
increasing dependency of small-size farmers on trans-national seed
companies and as a result the erosion of both bio-diversity and food
security, et cetera. According to Keith Douglas Warner the principle of
the universal destination of goods remains primordial towards (indi-
vidual) private property rights and thus constitutes a principle that
signiﬁcantly limits the potential for ethically acceptable bio-patents:
The Catholic social teaching tradition and its principle of the universal destination of
goods fundamentally conﬂicts with the negative right conferred by gene patents. The
Catholic principle of the universal destination of goods implies that genes, gene
sequences, and engineered crop varieties are ineligible for patent protection,
although the processes to engineer these should be eligible. (Warner, 2001, p. 361).21
Considering the theological evaluation of bio-patenting outlined here in
light of the aforementioned ‘‘problem of an inappropriate ethics,’’ one needs
to conclude that, in a theological or religious understanding, a speciﬁc
emphasis is placed on the criticism of bio-patenting through the theolo-
goumena of the ‘‘sanctity’’ of life and of the ‘‘dignity as a creature.’’ The ﬁrst
two arguments, after all, are not conceivable without reference to theology
and without such recourse prove inadequate with view to agricultural bio-
technology. It appears, though, that the ‘‘strength’’ of theological critique is
at the same time its weakest spot: Outside religious context, it proves highly
problematic to argue in favor of the conviction that all living beings are
accorded a speciﬁc dignity, that is particularity, that necessitates the rec-
ognition of life’s special need for protection and that negates any intellectual
property rights in the realm of living things. Therefore, without further
assistance, this argumentation fails to establish an appropriate basis for
legislation in a pluralistic and non-biased society with its diversity of
interests, convictions, and lifestyles. And irrespective of this, even for a
theological ethics that speciﬁcally seeks to address the realm of (Christian)
faith and community only, the notion of the ‘‘dignity as a creature’’ that is at
its core, categorically diﬀers from the concept of ‘‘human dignity’’ that is
central to the EC bio-patenting directive and that tries to establish the
human being as distinct and unique from other living beings.
Hence, theological critique on bio-patenting ultimately fails to provide
eﬀective answers to the problems detailed above in just the same way as any
21 Whether the principle of the universal destination of goods really works as an argument
against bio-patenting or at least against speciﬁc forms thereof, requires, in my opinion, a
thorough examination. Basically, patenting speciﬁcally aims at fostering technological inno-
vation for the common good, whereas the granting of economic privileges to the inventor in
form of exclusive rights is just a secondary goal that even can be characterized as just a means
for realizing the proper end of any patenting regime.
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other (non-theological) moral theory. Therefore theological ethics does not
provide a solution to the ‘‘problem of inappropriate ethics’’ as outlined
above.
6. THE ‘‘PROBLEM OF AN IMPEDIMENT TO COMPREHENSIVE
AND EFFECTIVE ETHICAL REVIEW BY THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF SPECIFIC ETHICAL PRINCIPLES INTO LAW’’
This second problem is very closely connected to the ‘‘problem of inap-
propriate ethics.’’ Nonetheless, in my opinion, the diﬀerentiation proposed
here facilitates the analysis of the problems considerably.
A patent does not confer a right to make use of the patented invention,
but only the right to exclude others from using the invention. Therefore, the
regulation of exploitation and use of patented innovations is considered to be
outside the scope of the patent system (Cf. Beyleveld and Brownsword, 2003,
p. 131). The doctrine that patent law must not regulate the use of techno-
logical inventions could be considered to be an important reason for the
avoidance of social ethics in the Directive. However, this would imply
signiﬁcant inconsistencies, because Article 6 of the Directive would be called
into question by this doctrine as well (Cf. Beyleveld and Brownsword, 2003).
There is no direct link between ethical deliberations on the one hand and the
question of legal protection of bio-technological inventions on the other in
the Directive. The moral restrictions on bio-patenting laid down in Article 6
do not exclude certain biotechnological inventions from patentability
because of patent implications, but only where the commercial exploitation
of the invention in question would be contrary to ordre public and morality.22
The abovementioned social–ethical problems of patenting in the ﬁeld
of agricultural bio-technology are more directly related to patents and
their exclusive function. Nevertheless, Article 6 oﬀers the sole point of
reference in the Directive for an ethical assessment of patent applications.
As already said, the given ‘‘interpretation guidelines’’ in the Directive in
conjunction with the failure to include, as criteria for unpatentability, the
protection of human, animal or plant life or health and the avoidance of
serious prejudice to the environment, as has been laid out in Article 27(2)
of the TRIPS Agreement, strongly suggest a very narrow interpretation of
Article 6. This might even render it impossible to exclude any agricultural
bio-technological innovations from patentability on the basis of ethical
22 Accordingly, Geertrui Van Overwalle proposes to amend the EC bio-patenting directive
by striking out article 6(2): ‘‘[P]atent law should not interfere when research is ethically unde-
sirable. Since a direct link is missing between ethics and patents in article 6(2), I take the view
that this provision should be abolished and the exclusions should be treated in research
regulations.’’ (Van Overwalle, 2003, p. 153. emphasis in original).
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considerations. Against this background, there is reason to believe that
the explicit inclusion of speciﬁc ethical principles into the legal framework
of the European patent system might further weaken the position of
ethics, particularly with a view to the bio-political debate on the legal
protection of technological innovations in the ﬁeld of agricultural bio-
technology. The area aﬀected by this phenomenon, which can only be
roughly adumbrated here and which I like to call the ‘‘problem of an
impediment to comprehensive and eﬀective ethical review by the imple-
mentation of speciﬁc ethical principles into law,’’ is not limited to bio-
patenting in the ﬁeld of agriculture and food production but also com-
prises patenting in the ﬁeld of bio-medicine. By taking a look at a
viewpoint described by Dieter Laudien, which is held by proponents of
extensive patent protection in the area of bio-technology, one may ﬁnd
some support for assuming so:
These ethical constraints including an explicit reference to the (German) Embryo
Protection Act as a limit to patentability are widely supported by the pharma-
ceutical industry research. Yet, it argues that as a matter of principle the patent
law deﬁnition of limits to patentability ought to be governed ﬁrst and foremost by
the ordre public clause (violation of public order and public morals) and that no
other reasons for exclusion but those given as examples in the Directive should
constitute guidelines for patent examiners and courts. (Laudien, 2003, p. 52.
Emphasis by C.B.).23
Given the ‘‘problem of an inappropriate ethics’’ outlined above, however, it
is evident that the selective inclusion of speciﬁc ethical principles into patent
law, or rather the (judicial) interpretation and implementation of legal
provisions in the ﬁeld of agricultural bio-technology according to such
principles, proves most signiﬁcant and yet, from an ethical perspective,
necessarily renders ethics rather useless. Due to the ‘‘hermetic character’’ of
the ethical part of the Directive that has been described before, social ethical
deliberations have little to no point of reference for aﬀecting legal practice in
patent law.
23 At the beginning of this quote, Laudien refers to the German federal government’s draft
proposal on the implementation of the bio-patenting Directive issued during the fourteenth
parliamentary (legislative) term (Source: Bundestagsdrucksache 14/5642 from March 23, 2001).
See also the position expressed by Tade Matthias Spranger, who, while discussing ethical
reservations about certain forms of bio-patenting, points to several articles of the EC directive
and then apodictically concludes that no further(-reaching) standards prove necessary. (Cf.
Spranger, 2003, p. 88). According to Spranger, ethical deliberations may serve as motives for
legislative bills or can inﬂuence the actual wording of legal norms, they should not, however, be
given an underlying role in the ‘‘practice of patenting’’ or carry too much weight with respect to
single issues. Hence, Spranger explains, the ‘‘somewhat unfortunate phrasing’’ of the EC
directive should ‘‘not add to expanding beyond scope the already observable discussion
according to which ethical considerations ought to weaken, in content, the impartial character
of patent law.’’ (Spranger, 1999, p. 598).
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7. CONCLUSION
If under speciﬁc situations a comprehensive and critical ethical analysis of
legal institutions such that the notion of the patent is necessarily rendered
ineﬀectual as a result of law, then law itself is found to be ethically prob-
lematic. From this, however, one cannot immediately reach too quickly for
ethical conclusions or demands, since the problems presented in the previous
section appear at ﬁrst glance to be open for interpretation as an intriguing
variant of moral theory’s well-known principle ‘‘ought implies can.’’ By
means of the directive 98/44/EG a European legal framework for bio-pat-
enting was installed – perhaps unintentionally or incidentally – that oﬀers no
possible point of reference for certain kinds of ethical critique towards
speciﬁc patent applications. As a result, there seems to be lacking some form
of requirement to consider innovations unpatentable if ethical reservations
arise or to at least limit the scope of patents where applicable.24 This
framework, however, is legal in character and thus subordinate to the
paramount ethical or moral duty. (Cf. Gewirth, 1978, p. 1). The ‘‘moral
point of view’’ is a critical view towards positive law, as has also been
recognized by authors who share Ju¨rgen Habermas’s understanding of the
relation between positive law and morality as a complementary relation.
Thus they reject such natural law concepts as a hierarchy of legal orders, as
epitomized by the claim, ‘‘positive law remains subordinate to, and is
oriented by, the moral law.’’ (Cf. Habermas (1996), here particularly
pp. 104–118 and pp. 447–).
Against this background, ‘‘opening up’’ legal texts for ethical critique
appears quite a natural solution to the aforementioned problem or to at
least help in this regard.25 Article 6 of the Directive neither constitutes a
necessary nor a suﬃcient instrument for an adequate consideration of the
ethical aspects of bio-patenting. Geertrui Van Overwalle’s proposition to
include all speciﬁcations of the ordre public and morality clause in the
TRIPS agreement into the European Patent Convention and thus to bring
into equilibrium bio-technology, patenting, and ethics, can also be under-
stood in the sense of an ethically indicated ‘‘opening up’’ of law texts (Cf.
Van Overwalle, 2003, p. 152). In addition, the potential of an ethical
assessment of patent applications could be diversiﬁed by treating the recitals
26 (informed consent) and 27 (information on the geographical origin of
24 The above-quoted viewpoints of Dieter Laudien and Tade Matthias Spranger seem to
support this notion.
25 Frans Brom (2003) articulates a similar demand but does not identify legal texts and their
interpretation as a starting point but rather locates it in a comprehensive public debate on the
issues in question.
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biological material)26 as binding prerequisites for patenting (Cf. Godt, 2003;
Van Overwalle, 2003). These proposals, however, have a common problem:
They can actually only provide a view on possible problems of the patenting
system in speciﬁc, concrete cases that have not yet been addressed in law,
but they ultimately fail to provide the much more dynamic modes of
evaluation required for (relatively) novel technologies and their short
innovation cycles, such as with bio-technology. Therefore, ultimately, the
question proves perfectly justiﬁed whether the patent system represents
an adequate instrument for the promotion of future developments in
the area of bio-technology, if its essential characteristics are rather devel-
oped for a ‘‘bricks-and-mortar-world’’ rather than for the age of informa-
tion economy (Eisenberg, 2002). It is a disputed question whether there is a
need for a new protection regime sui generis for realizing the fostering of
research and innovation, for rewarding inventions, and for the expansion of
public domain knowledge and of all possibilities that could prove both more
useful and more reasonable. From an ethical perspective, the answer to me
seems clear.
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